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A lump-sum intergovernmental transfer has a “price effect”, as well as an “income 
effect”, because it allows the recipient government to reduce its tax rate, which lowers its 
marginal cost of public funds, while still providing the same level of public service.  This 
reduction in the effective price of providing the public service helps to explain the 
“flypaper effect”—the empirical observation that a lump-sum grant has a much larger 
effect on spending than an increase in personal income.  Contrary to the assertions of 
Mieszkowski (1994) and Hines and Thaler (1995), a model of a benevolent local 
government financing its expenditures with a distortionary tax predicts flypaper effects 





 The traditional theory of intergovernmental transfers implicitly assumed that sub-
national governments financed their discretionary expenditures with lump-sum taxes, and 
it drew three conclusions about the expenditure effects of grants: 
First, general lump-sum and specific lump-sum grants have the same effects 
on grantee spending because they have only an income effect. Second, open-
ended matching grants have a greater stimulatory effect on grantee spending 
than equivalent lump-sum grants because they have both income and 
substitution effects. Third, general lump-sum grants have similar (or the 
same) stimulatory effects on grantee spending as an equivalent rise in 
income in the community.
1 
 
The first conclusion—lump-sum transfer do not have a price effect—and the third 
conclusion—equivalent spending effects from lump-sum grant and personal income 
increases—are not valid when a recipient government uses distortionary taxes to finance 
its expenditures, while the second conclusion—“a greater expenditure stimulative effect 
from matching grants”—continues to hold. 
Demonstrating that lump-sum grants have a “price effect” is important because 
much of the literature on intergovernmental grants continues to describe lump-sum 
intergovernmental transfers as only having an “income effect”.  See, for example, the 
recent survey paper by Shah (2007, Table 1.1, p.10).  We show that a lump-sum grant has 
a price effect when a recipient government uses distortionary taxes to finance its 
spending because the effective price of its public services is the product of its marginal 
cost of public funds (MCF) and the marginal production cost of the service.  When a 
subnational government receives a lump-sum transfer, it can reduce its tax rate and still 
provide the same level of service.  At the lower tax rate, the MCF will, under plausible 
assumptions, be lower, and therefore the effective price of providing the public service is 
                                                 
1Bailey and Connolly (1998, p.336). 
  1reduced.  The price effect of a lump-sum grant will be greater when the ratio of the lump-
sum transfers to the own-source tax revenues collected by the subnational government is 
higher and when the subnational government’s MCF is higher.  We show that while 
lump-sum grants have a price effect as well as an income effect, a revenue-neutral switch 
from a lump-sum grant to a matching grant would increase the provision of the public 
service by the subnational government.   
  For plausible parameter values, the reduction in the effective price of public 
services caused by lump-sum grants can be quite large and can explain the flypaper 
effect—the empirical observation that a lump-sum grant has a much larger effect on 
spending than an increase in personal income.  As noted above, the conventional model 
of intergovernmental grants assumes that a benevolent subnational government uses 
lump-sum taxes to finance its expenditures and predicts that lump-sum grants should 
have the same impact on spending as an equivalent increase in personal income.  See 
Bradford and Oates (1971).  Therefore, the flypaper effect was labeled an “anomaly” in a 
widely cited paper by Hines and Thaler (1995), and various alternative explanations have 
been put forward to account for it, including fiscal illusion on the part of voters and the 
control exerted by expenditure-maximizing bureaucracies.  See Dollery and Worthington 
(1996), Bailey and Connolly (1998), and Gamkhar and Shah (2007) for surveys of the 
empirical evidence on the flypaper effect and the various attempts that have been put 
forward to explain it. 
  Hamilton (1986) was the first to point out that a flypaper effect can arise because 
subnational governments typically use distortionary taxes to finance at least part of their 
expenditures.  More recently, Becker and Mulligan (2003) and Volden (2007) have 
  2developed political economy models that exhibit a flypaper effect because recipient 
governments rely on distortionary taxes to finance part of their spending.
2  However, 
neither of these papers shows that distortionary taxes can explain the magnitude of the 
flypaper effect.  This is important because Hines and Thaler (1995, p.221) dismissed 
distortionary taxation as an explanation of the flypaper by asserting that “the marginal 
deadweight losses from taxes are typically far too small to reconcile the large differences 
between propensities to spend out of changes in grants and changes in private incomes.”  
Mieszkowski (1994) also expressed scepticism about the ability of distortionary taxes to 
account for flypaper effect.  He argued that MCF would have to exceed four in order for 
distortionary taxes to generate the observed flypaper effects.  (We will show that 
Mieszkowski’s conjecture is not correct, and that the flypaper effects of the magnitude 
observed in many econometric studies can be generated with MCFs around 1.5.) 
Perhaps because of the scepticism expressed by Hines and Thaler and 
Mieskowski, Hamilton’s explanation of the flypaper effect has not received the attention 
that it deserves.  Oates (1999), in his comprehensive review of the literature on fiscal 
federalism, does not refer to Hamilton’s paper in discussing the flypaper effect.  Shah 
(2007) only provides a passing reference to Hamilton’s explanation and focuses on 
bureaucratic power or voter myopia as explanations of the flypaper effect.  We believe 
that distortionary taxation should receive more attention in the analysis of the effects of 
intergovernmental grants because the distortionary effects of taxation is a key problem at 
all levels of government, and it has a large influence on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations.  Our model predicts that the flypaper effect will be larger if (a) the subnational 
government’s taxes are a small share of personal income, (b) the income elasticities of 
                                                 
2 For an alternative political economy model of the flypaper effect, see Roemer and Silvestre (2002). 
  3the tax base and the demand for the public service are low, (c) the subnational 
government’s marginal cost of public funds is high, or (d) the tax base becomes more tax 
sensitive as the tax rate increases.  Contrary to the assertions of Hines and Thaler and 
Mieszkowski, we show that given reasonable parameter values the model predicts 
flypaper effects that are similar to those observed in many econometric studies.  
Therefore the flypaper effect should not be viewed as an “anomaly”, to be explained by 
politicians’ or bureaucrats’ failure to implement policies that benefit taxpayer.  The 
flypaper effect is an “intrinsic” aspect of most subnational government’s fiscal behaviour.  
It is a predictable consequence of the use of distortionary taxes to finance a subnational 
government’s spending. 
In Section 1, we show that when subnational governments levy distortionary taxes 
lump-sum transfers have a substitution or “price effect” as well as an “income effect”.  In 
Section 2, matching grants are shown to have a greater stimulative effect than lump-sum 
grants.  In Section 3, we show that the model can predict “flypaper effects” of the same 
magnitude as those found in most econometric studies for plausible values of the MCFs 
for state and local governments in many countries.  We review a number of econometric 
studies and conclude that they only yield ambiguous results concerning the model’s 
prediction that the size of the flypaper effect should vary directly with the subnational 
government’s MCF.  In part, this is because there are few empirical studies of the MCFs 
of state and local governments.  Section 4 summarizes our main results and suggests 
another way of testing the distortionary tax model’s predictions concerning the 
expenditure effects of intergovernmental grants. 
 
  41.  The Price Effects of Lump-Sum Intergovernmental Transfers 
The conventional analysis of intergovernmental transfers usually assumes that 
unconditional grants only have an “income effect” for the recipient government, whereas 
matching grants have both a “price effect” and an “income effect”.  Alternatively, it has 
been argued by Oates (1979), Borge (1995), and others that lump-sum grants have price 
effects because of fiscal illusion.  In their view, voters’ desired spending levels are based 
on the average price of the public service, and lump-sum grants reduce the average price 
of the service, but not the marginal price.  In this section, we show that lump-sum grants 
can reduce the marginal price of public services for a recipient government that relies on 
distortionary taxation, and that “fiscal illusion” is not required for lump-sum grants to 
generate a price effect.   
Each subnational government is assumed to have a homogeneous immobile 
population that can be represented by the income and preferences of a single resident.  
The subnational government levies a tax rate t on its per capita tax base, B, and provides 
a public service, g, at a constant per capita unit production cost of c. We assume that g is 
a purely consumptive public service and that it enters that utility function of individuals 
as an additively separable variable.  Let T be the per capita lump-sum transfer received 
by the subnational government.  Its budget constraint is  0 g c T B t = − + .  The utility 
function of the representative resident is U = u(x, B) + Γ(g) where x is a composite 
private consumption good, with price equal to one,  () ⋅ u  is a quasi-concave function, and 
, and  .  The price of the taxed good, B, is 1 + t.  It will be convenient to 
represent the well-being of the representative resident by the reduced-form indirect utility 
function V = V(t, g, Y) where Y is the lump-sum income of the representative resident of 
0 > Γ′ 0 < Γ′ ′
  5the subnational government and the resident’s marginal utility of income is VY = λ > 0.  
Given our assumption that the tax burden is not shifted to the residents of other 
jurisdictions, Vt = - λB < 0.  The marginal benefit from the subnational government’s 
public service will be defined as MB = λ
-1Vg.  In general, the marginal benefit from the 
public service will be a function not only of g, but also of Y and t because they will affect 
the marginal utility of income, λ. 
  The government’s marginal cost of public funds, which represents the cost to the 
private sector of raising an extra dollar of tax revenue through a tax rate increase, plays 















MCF ) (         ( 1 )  
where  t B ∂ ∂ = η ln < 0 is the semi-elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate 
which is a measure of the shrinkage of the tax base because of tax avoidance or tax 
evasion.  The numerator in (1) reflects the fact that the harm to the representative 
household from a small tax rate increase is proportional to the tax base.  The denominator 
is the rate of increase in the government’s tax revenues from a small tax rate increase, 
and therefore the ratio represents the marginal cost to residents of raising an additional 
dollar of tax revenue through a tax rate increase by their subnational government.  We 
assume that the government is always on the upward-sloping section of its Laffer curve 
and therefore 1 + tη > 0.  At the revenue-maximizing tax rate, t = -1/η, the MCF would be 
infinite because a small tax rate increase would impose a burden on households without 
                                                 
3 There is a very large literature on the interpretation and measurement of the MCF.  See Dahlby (2008a) 
for comprehensive treatment of the concept and measurement of the MCF. 
  6raising any additional revenues.  For this reason it is assumed that t < -1/η.  Note also that 
 if t = 0.    1 MCF =
A key assumption that we make is that the MCF increases as the local government 
increases its tax rate.  The effect of a tax rate increase on the MCF, holding public 
expenditures constant, is: 
()






η          ( 2 )  
where E = (dη/dt)(t/η) is the elasticity of the semi-elasticity of the tax base with respect to 
the tax rate.  Consequently, the MCF will be increasing in the tax rate if -1 < E.  In other 
words, as the tax rate increases, the tax base might become less tax sensitive, i.e. E < 0.  
For example, as the tax rate on increases the demand for a taxed commodity might 
become less price elastic as individuals consume less of it.  However, the MCF will 
increase as the tax rate increases as long as the reduction in tax sensitivity is not too great.  
This is expressed in the condition -1 < E.  Although we have limited knowledge about 
how the tax sensitivity of tax bases changes with the tax rate, it seems plausible to 
assume that -1 < E and that the MCF increases as the government raises more revenue.  
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that this characterizes a local government’s 
fiscal situation. 
  The subnational government will maximize the well-being of its residents by 
providing the public service up to the point where its marginal benefit, MB, equals its 
effective price, or  .  Figure 1 shows the impact of an unconditional transfer 
on a subnational government’s provision of a public service.  Initially, it is assumed that 
the subnational government does not receive any transfers, and it finances its 
expenditures by levying a distortionary tax.  While the cost of producing the service is 
c MCF P ⋅ ≡
  7assumed to be constant, the MCF increases with the tax rate, and therefore P increases 
with the level of service provided.  A benevolent subnational government would provide 
g
0 units of the public service where the marginal benefit of the public service is equal to 
its effective price. 
  Now consider the effect of an unconditional lump-sum transfer, T, from a higher 
level of government.  This displaces the effective price schedule to the right by T/c units 
of the public service, and the subnational government would increase its provision of the 
service to g
1 units.  Three things should be noted about the effects of the lump-sum grant 
shown in Figure 1.  First, it has been assumed that the MB curve does not shift with the 
introduction of a lump-sum grant in order to focus on the price effect of the grant.  In 
Section 3, we will show how a lump-sum grant may shift the MB curve.  Second, the 
increase in spending on the service will be less than the amount of the transfer unless the 
marginal benefit of the public service is constant.  If the marginal benefit from the public 
service declines as more of the service is provided, which is assumed to be the case in 
Figure 1, the transfer will result in a reduction in the recipient government’s own-source 
tax revenues as well as an increase in its provision of the public service.  Third, the 
unconditional transfer reduces the effective price of the public good.  In particular, at the 
initial level of the public service, g
0, the effective price of the service will decline 
because, with the lump-sum transfer, the government can reduce its tax rate and still 
provide the same level of service.  At the lower tax rate, the MCF is lower, and therefore 
the effective price of providing the public service is reduced. 
  8Holding spending on the public service constant,   and 
.  Therefore, the elasticity of the effective price of the 
public service with respect to a lump-sum transfer is:
MCF B T t
1⋅ − = ∂ ∂
− /
( E 1 MCF c t P
2 + ⋅ ⋅ η ⋅ − = ∂ ∂ / )
4 
















                                                
       ( 3 )  
Lump-sum transfers do not have a price effect if MCF = 1, i.e. when a subnational 
government only use lump-sum taxes to finance its expenditures, or if E = -1, i.e. the tax 
base becomes sufficiently less tax sensitive to exactly offset the effect of the increase in 
the tax rate on the MCF.  Given our assumptions that MCF > 1 and -1 < E, a lump-sum 
grant will have a price effect which will be larger the higher the ratio of the lump-sum 
transfers to the tax revenues collected by the subnational government and the higher the 
subnational government’s MCF.  In some contexts, the price effects of lump-sum 
transfers can be quite large.  For example, in Brazil, the ratio of transfers to own-source 
revenues for municipal governments is 3.0.
5  If a Brazilian municipal government’s MCF 
is 1.50 and η is constant (E = 0), the elasticity of the tax price of its public services with 
respect to lump-sum transfers is -2.25, indicating a potentially large price reduction from 
an increase in a lump-sum grant.  
 
2.  The Expenditure Effects of Lump-Sum and Matching Grants 
  Given that a lump-sum grant has a price effect, it is interesting to compare its 
expenditure stimulation effect with that of an equivalent matching grant.  The effect of an 
 
4 Details of the derivations of the key results in this paper are contained in the appendix. 
5 See Mendes and Boueri Miranda (2008, Table I.1).  
  9open-ended matching grant on provision of the public service is shown in Figure 2.  (As 
in Figure 1, we maintain the assumption that the MB curve does not shift.)  The 
introduction of the matching grant shifts down the line representing the effective price of 
public services, and it also reduces the slope of the effective price line because now the 
subnational government can finance a given level of the public service at a lower tax rate.  
To compare the expenditure effects of a revenue-neutral switch from a lump-sum tax to a 
matching grant, we use equation (4), the optimality condition for the provision of the 










, ,                  ( 4 )  
() g c m T Y t B t − = + 1 ) , (                  ( 5 )  
We will assume that the marginal benefit of the public service declines as more of the 
service is provided, MBg < 0, that the “demand” for the public service may increase with 
income MBY ≥ 0, and that an increase in the tax rate does not increase the demand for the 
public service, MBt ≤ 0.  (The conditions under which the latter assumption holds will be 
derived in next section.)  The matching rate for a matching grant is m with 0 ≤ m < 1.  
We also make a number of specific assumptions about the effects of the key variables on 
the government’s tax base.  First, it assumed to be decreasing in the tax rate because of 
tax avoidance and tax evasion effects, Bt < 0.  Second, the tax base may be increasing in 
household income, BY ≥ 0.  For example, the value of the property tax base of a 
subnational government will usually increase if residents have higher incomes because 
they will live in larger and more expensive dwellings or the value of industrial and 
commercial property will be higher.  Third, we assume that provision of the public 
service does not affect the size of the tax base, Bg = 0. 
  10Taking the total differential of equations (4) and (5), we can obtain the following 
expressions for the effects of higher lump-sum transfers or a higher matching rate on the 
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The model predicts that the provision of the public service will increase if there is an 
increase in lump-sum transfers or the matching rate for an open-ended matching grant.  
Combining (6) and (7), we can compare the expenditure effects of an increase in a 
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        ( 9 )  
Since the second term on the right-hand side of (9) is positive, the model predicts that a 
revenue-neutral switch from a lump-sum grant to a matching grant would increase the 
provision of the public service by the subnational government.
6  This is also the 
prediction of the conventional analysis of intergovernmental grants, which assumes that 
the subnational government only imposes lump-sum taxes. 
 
3.  Distortionary Taxes and the Flypaper Effect 
Our model can help to explain Hamilton’s key insight that distortionary taxes give 
rise to a flypaper effect, i.e. an additional dollar in the hands of the subnational 
                                                 
6 Econometric evidence in support of this prediction is found in studies using Canadian data by Coyte and 
Landon (1990) and Baker, Payne, and Smart (1999). 
  11government, received through a lump-sum grant, has a much larger effect on its 
expenditures than an additional dollar in the pockets in its residents.  As noted above, the 
conventional model, which predicts that an increase in personal income and an increase 
lump-sum transfers should have equivalent effects on a subnational government’s 
spending, is based on the assumption that the subnational government uses lump-sum 
taxes to finance their expenditures.  Once the assumption of lump-sum taxes is replaced 
with the more realistic assumption that the recipient government’s expenditures are 
financed, at least in part, by distortionary taxes, then the “equivalence result” no longer 
holds.
7   
As noted in the previous section, an increase in the incomes of the residents of a 
subnational government can affect the provision of a public service in two ways.  First, 
an increase in income will usually increase a government’s tax base, and therefore a 
given level of spending can be financed at a lower tax rate, resulting in a lower MCF.  
The reduction in the effective price of public services from an increase fiscal capacity 
induced by an increase in residents’ incomes is shown in Figure 3 as the downward shift 
in the effective price line from  c MCF ⋅  to  c F MC ⋅ ′ . 
An increase in residents’ incomes may also increase the demand for public 
services.  In other words, at higher income levels, households may place a higher value 
on public services such as education or cleaner streets.  In Figure 3, this is shown as an 
upward shift in the marginal benefit schedule to  B M ′.  As a result of the increase in the 
demand for the public service and the increase in fiscal capacity arising from an increase 
                                                 
7 There is a parallel between the equivalence of personal income increases and lump-sum transfers on 
subnational governments’ spending and Ricardian equivalence.  Both are based on the assumption that 
governments finance their expenditures with lump-sum taxes.  When governments resort to distortionary 
taxes, both equivalence results break-down. 
  12in income, the provision of the public service would increase from g
0 to g
1.  Comparing 
Figure 1 with Figure 3, we can see that equal per capita increases in lump-sum grants and 
personal incomes will almost invariably have different effects because they produce 
different shifts in the key relationships that determine the provision of the public service 
by the subnational government.  Therefore, the non-equivalence of these effects should 
not come as a surprise or be viewed as an anomaly.  Again, taking the total differential of 
(4) and (5), we obtain an expression for the stimulative effect of an increase in household 
income: 
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             (10) 
What can this simple model say about the relative sizes of the stimulative effects 
of lump-sum grants and personal income?  Does the model predict that the former will be 
substantially greater than the latter as many empirical studies have shown? 
  In order to compare the stimulative effects of a lump-sum grant and an increase in 
personal income, we need to parameterize the changes in fiscal capacity and the demand 
for public services arising from an increase in personal incomes and the change in the 
demand for public services as the tax rate changes.  To this end, let the elasticity of the 
subnational government’s tax base with respect to average personal income be 
( ) B Y BY = θ .  We expect θ to be positive, reflecting the income elasticity of demand for 
the tax base.  Similarly, let the income elasticity of the marginal benefit of the public 
service be  ( ) Y MB MB Y = ν .  If residents place a higher value of public services as 
income rises, then we expect ν to be positive.  Finally, let the elasticity of the marginal 
benefit from the public service with respect to the tax rate be  ( ) . t MB MB t = φ  
  13  To examine the relationship between t and MB in more detail, recall that MB is 


























2        ( 1 1 )  
because Vgt = 0 given our assumption that utility function is additively separable in g.  
Consequently, φ is the negative of the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with 
respect to the tax rate.  This implies that if a reduction in the tax rate (induced by an 
increase in a lump-sum grant) causes the marginal utility of income to decline, then the 
marginal benefit from the public service will increase.  In terms of Figure 1, this would 
imply that the MB curve would shift up with an increase in a lump-sum grant, and its 
stimulative effect would be enhanced.  To determine the conditions under which φ  < 0, 
note that an increase in the tax rate increases the price of the taxed good B.  The impact 
of a tax rate increase on the marginal utility of income is therefore equal to 
() () Y B Y B t ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ λ λ λ .  With some manipulation of this condition, it can be 
shown that  [] θ ρ τ φ + =  where  ( )( ) Y Y ∂ ∂ = λ λ ρ  is the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of income with respect to household income and τ = tB/Y is the subnational 
government’s taxes as a proportion of the household’s income.  Since we are assuming 
that B is a normal good and θ > 0, a necessary condition for φ to be negative is 
diminishing marginal utility of income.  It is possible that φ  will be positive, and the MB 
curve will shift down with an increase in a lump-sum grant if  0 > + θ ρ , but we expect 
any shifts in the MB curve, up or down, from tax rate changes to be relatively small 
because subnational governments’ taxes as a share of personal income are typically quite 
low. 
  14  With this background, we can now compare the stimulative effects of a lump-sum 
grant with an increase in personal income using (6) and (10): 
() ( ) dT
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θ τ             (12) 
In other words, the model predicts a flypaper effect—a lump-sum grant increase has a 
larger effect on spending than an increase in personal income—if the expression in 
square brackets is less than one.  Given our assumption that  0 ≤ φ , the flypaper effect 
will be larger if the subnational government’s taxes are a small share of personal income, 
if the income elasticities of the tax base and the demand for the public service are low, if 
the subnational government’s taxes are highly distortionary, or if the tax base becomes 
more tax sensitive as the tax rate increases.  When the MCF is very high, the ratio of the 
expenditure effects of personal income and a lump-sum transfer approaches Y tB = θ τ , 
which in most cases will be substantially below one.   
A numerical example can shed some light on the predicted flypaper effect.  If the 
tax base and the valuation of public services have unitary income elasticities (θ =   = 1), 
if the MCF = 1.50, E = 0, 
ν
0 = φ , and τ = 0.10, (a relatively high value for most 
countries), then dT dg dY dg 233 . 0 = .  In other words, the effect of a lump-sum grant on 
subnational government’s public spending would be four to five times as large as the 
effect of an equivalent increase in average incomes.   
Our model predicts that the MCF has an important impact on the size of the 
flypaper effect, but unfortunately there are few studies of the MCF at the state and local 
government level.  However, one well-known study of the Laffer curves, or “revenue 
hills”, for four large U.S. cities by Haughtwout et al. (2004) indicates that the MCFs for 
  15property taxes in 2001 were 1.56 in Minneapolis, 5.00 in Philadelphia, 10.00 in New 
York and undefined in Houston because it was on the downward sloping section of its 
Laffer curve for property tax revenue.
8  Given these high MCFs, we would expect that 
these cities would exhibit large flypaper effects. 
Figure 4 shows the relative impacts of lump-sum transfers and personal income 
for a range of values of the MCF for θ = 1, υ = 1, E = 0, and τ = 0.10 with and ρ = 0, -1, 
and -2 (φ  =  0.10, 0, and -0.10).  The figure indicates that the MCF must be close to one 
for a personal income increase to have a larger stimulate effect than a lump-sum grant 
increase and that substantial flypaper effects are generated with relatively low values for 
the MCF even if ρ = 0 and therefore  . 10 . 0 = φ   Thus the model predicts, given plausible 
values for the MCF and the other parameter values, flypaper effects which are similar to 
those observed in many empirical studies.  Given on these calculations, it is difficult to 
see on what basis Hines and Thaler (1995, p.221) dismissed the effects of distortionary 
taxes as “far too small to reconcile the large differences between propensities to spend 
out of changes in grants and changes in private incomes.” 
Another way to illustrate the potential size of the flypaper effect is to consider a 
specific example where individuals have the following Cobb-Douglas utility function 
defined over two private goods, x1 and x2, and the locally-provided public service g: 
() () () g x x U 2 1 ln ln ln γ + β + α =      α > 0, β > 0, γ > 0, α + β = 1      (13) 
It is assumed that the producer prices of all three goods are constant and equal to one.  
The local government imposes a per unit tax of t1 on x1 and therefore the consumer price 
                                                 
8 The MCF can be calculated as (1 + εBt)
-1 where εBt is the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax 
rate. Note that εBt = tη.  These elasticities for the four cities in 2001 were -0.36 for Minneapolis, -0.80 for 
Philadelphia, -0.90 for New York, and -1.13 for Houston.  See Haughwout et al. (2004, Table 1, p.547). 
  16of x1 is 1 + t1.  The demands for the two private goods are x1 = αY/(1 + t1) and x2 = βY 
where Y is the representative taxpayer’s income.  The local government’s budget 








=           ( 1 4 )  
Substituting x1 and x2 into (13) yields the indirect utility function: 
















= )        ( 1 5 )  
Maximizing (15) with respect to t1 and g subject to the government’s budget constraint in 





=            ( 1 6 )  
Substituting the optimal tax rate in (16) into the budget constraint in (14) yields the 
following equation for the optimal provision of the public service: 
( T Y g + α
γ + α )
γ






α =            ( 1 8 )  
Since α is the budget share of taxed good, the flypaper effect will be inversely related to 
the relative size of the local government’s tax base.
9  Local governments often have 
relatively narrow tax bases, such as property taxes on residential housing or a sales tax on 
a restricted range of goods and services, and therefore α may be quite low.  
                                                 
9 With the Cobb-Douglas utility function, λ = 1/Y, MB = γY/g and therefore υ = 1.  Also, θ = 1, ρ = -1, and 
therefore φ = 0.  In addition, η = -(1 + t1)
-1, E = -t1(1 + t1)
-1 and MCF = 1 + t1.  Substituting these 
expressions plus τ = αt1(1 + t1)
-1 into (12) also yields (18). 
  17Consequently, local governments with narrow tax bases will tend to exhibit large 
flypaper effects. 
Although we have stressed the effects of increased transfers on the recipient 
governments’ expenditures, the model is symmetric and predicts that the grantor 
government will reduce its expenditures on the public services that it provides when it 
increases its transfers to another level of government.
10  Increasing transfers forces the 
grantor government to increase its tax rate and/or cut its own expenditures.  Our model 
predicts that the grantor government will reduce its expenditures because of the increase 
in its marginal cost of public funds from a tax rate increase, but that it will cut its own 
expenditures by less than the amount of the increase in the transfer.  The reduction in the 
grantor government’s per capita spending on its own services may be greater than or less 
than the increase in per capita spending by the recipient governments because of 
differences in the MCFs and the price elasticities of demand for services between the two 
levels of government. 
  A number of econometric studies of the flypaper effect can be interpreted in light 
of the prediction that the flypaper effect will be larger when the recipient government’s 
MCF is higher.  Winer (1982) estimated a model of the effects of grants on Canadian 
provincial government spending between 1952 and 1970 and found that the stimulative 
effects of the grants were twice as large for the poor Atlantic provinces as for the richer 
provinces.  This result is consistent with the view that the small Atlantic provinces, with 
relatively low tax bases, have difficulty raising additional tax revenue, and therefore have 
                                                 
10 Logan (1986) developed a model which also predicts that a reduction in expenditures by the grantor 
government based on the hypothesis that such an increase in transfers creates the fiscal illusion that the 
price of the grantor government’s own services have increased.  Logan’s model does not explain why the 
politicians in the grantor government would want to foster the fiscal illusion that the prices of the public 
services that they provide have increased by transferring funds to other levels of government. 
  18higher MCFs than the richer provinces.  However, the Canadian fiscal equalization 
program may have reduced the MCFs of the Atlantic provinces by compensating them 
for reduction in their tax bases when they raise their tax rates,
11 and therefore it not clear 
that their perceived MCFs are lower than the other provinces’ MCFs. 
  More recently, Shaw (2005, p.62) has estimated the expenditure effects of federal 
transfers to the Canadian provinces, based on data for the period 1981 to 2001, and he 
found that “federal grants tend to stimulate provincial-local expenditures by much more 
than increases in private income, though there exists substantial variation in marginal 
responses across provinces. The impact of grants on spending tends to be relatively low 
for provinces receiving large equalization payments whereas grants to Ontario, and 
especially Alberta, are very stimulative.”  Shaw’s results are consistent with the 
predictions of our model if Alberta and Ontario, the two non-equalization receiving 
provinces, have higher MCFs than the equalization-receiving provinces.  Therefore these 
Canadian studies lead to conflicting conclusion regarding which provinces exhibit larger 
flypaper effects, and the relative size of their MCFs is ambiguous because of the 
incentive effects produced by the equalization formula. 
Blanco (2006) found that the flypaper effect in Brazil was stronger in 
municipalities with larger geographic areas. He interpreted this result as consistent with a 
budget-maximizing bureaucracy explanation of the flypaper effect because residents of 
larger municipalities would find it harder to move to other municipalities that might 
spend less on public services and offer lower taxes.  However, there is an alternative 
interpretation of Blanco’s finding.  The municipalities which have large geographic areas 
                                                 
11 See Smart (1998, 2006) and Dahlby (2002). 
  19are concentrated in the North and North East of Brazil, which are areas of poverty and 
low levels of economic development where the municipal governments have very low 
fiscal capacity.  We would expect such municipalities to have high MCFs and therefore 
our model would predict that these municipalities would exhibit relatively large flypaper 
effects.  The evidence from the Blanco study, while confirming the existence of 
substantial flypaper effects, does not resolve the question of the primary source of these 
effects. 
Volden (2007)’s political economy model predicts that the flypaper effect will be 
larger when the difference in the MCFs of the recipient and donor governments is larger.  
He has argued that the sizes of estimated values of stimulative effects of grants in the US 
studies reviewed by Hines and Thaler (1996) follow this predicted pattern with the largest 
effect, $1.06 of additional spending per grant dollar, “for a federal grant to West Virginia 
school districts.  The smallest effect was for state and federal grants to large urban 
governments.  Clustered between 0.40 and 0.65 are grants from the federal government to 
the states or from state governments to localities, as we might expect.”  Volden (2007, 
p.225).  Note however that these result may conflict with the estimates by Haughwout et 
al. which indicate that the MCFs for at least four large U.S. cities are very high and with 
the study by Buettner and Wildasin (2006, Table 7, p.1129) which found that a 
permanent one dollar per capita increase in grants results in a 70.2 cent increase in 
spending by large U.S. cities compared to a 52.5 cent increase in spending for small 
cities.  
With regard to the expenditure effects on grantor governments, Logan (1986) 
found that an additional dollar of federal transfers to the state governments in the United 
  20States reduced federal spending in other areas by $1.53 to $2.12.  While Logan’s estimate 
of the reduction in grantor government spending exceeds the amount predicted by our 
model, Hammes and Wills (1987) found that a one dollar increase in the Canadian federal 
government’s transfers to the provinces reduced its spending in its own areas by 0.81 to 
1.33, depending on the specification of the model.  Similarly, Dollery and Worthington 
(1995) and Stewart (1996) found that increases in grants to the state governments in 
Australia reduced the Commonwealth government’s expenditures on its own services. 
The former study did not give an estimate of the displacement effect, but the point 
estimate in the Stewart (1996) study was -0.99.  
In summary, the empirical evidence on the magnitude, direction, and variations in 
the flypaper effect is somewhat contradictory and neither confirms nor rejects the 
predictions of the distortionary tax model of the flypaper effect.  Formulating testable 
models of the flypaper effect based on the distortionary tax model and comparing the 
results with the alternative models based on fiscal illusion or bureaucratic power would 
be very valuable addition to the empirical literature. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
  Understanding the factors that cause the flypaper effect is important for 
developing policies with regard to intergovernmental finances. Those who think that the 
flypaper effect is based on voters’ fiscal illusion, or the excessive influence that budget-
maximizing bureaucrats have over spending, tend to argue for reduced transfers and more 
reliance on subnational government taxation in financing their expenditures. Or, as Oates 
(1994, p.135) expressed it, “Taken at face value, the flypaper effect has some rather 
  21damning implications for the functioning of democratic institutions.  It suggests that the 
representatives of the populace in state and local government do not follow, in budgetary 
terms at least, the will of the electorate.”  On the other hand, in our model a large 
flypaper effect indicates that subnational governments have high MCFs and provide 
correspondingly low levels of public services.  Under these circumstances, higher 
transfers to subnational governments may be welfare improving if the central government 
has a lower MCF than the subnational governments.
12  Therefore, resolving the source of 
the flypaper effect is important for deriving policy conclusions regarding the appropriate 
level of transfers to subnational governments. 
The model of the flypaper effect that we have outlined in this paper may help 
researchers test for the underlying cause of the high rate of spending out of lump-sum 
transfers.  In an earlier version of this paper, we showed that a subnational government 
will reduce its tax collection effort when it receives a lump-sum transfer, and this 
prediction seems to set the distortionary tax explanation of the flypaper effect apart from 
the other explanations of the flypaper effect.  Models of the flypaper effect based on the 
bureaucrats’ desire to maximize its budget or voters’ fiscal illusion are unlikely to predict 
reduced tax collection effort with higher grants.  Thus any empirical evidence that 
subnational governments cut tax collect effort in response to grants would provide strong 
support for the marginal cost of public funds explanation of the flypaper effect.  
                                                 
12 See Dahlby (2008b) for a model of optimal intergovernmental transfers based on equalizing the MCFs 
between levels of government. 
  22Appendix: Derivation of the Key Results 
 
Derivation of Equation (3) 
From the definition of the effective price of the public service and the formula for the 
MCF, we have: 
()
1 1
− + = ⋅ ≡ η t c c MCF P  
Taking the derivative of P with respect to t and noting that  t E η η) / 1 ( = , we obtain: 
() ( ) () (
2 2 1 1 1
− − + + − = + + − = η η η η η t E c t t c
dt
dP
t )  
Taking the total differential of the budget constraint and holding g constant, we obtain 
, which yields  0 = + + dT dt B t dt B t ( )
1 1 /
− + − = η t B dT dt .  The price effect of an 
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Substituting  () η η t t MCF + = − 1 / 1  and  ( )
1 1
− + = η t MCF into the above equation 
yields equation (3). 
 
  23Derivations of Equations (6) to (12) 
Since , the optimality condition and the government’s budget constraint 
can be written as: 
(
1 1
− + = η t MCF )
) () () (c m t Y g MB t − = ⋅ + 1 , , 1 η  
() ( ) g c m T Y t B t − = + 1 ,  
where we assume MBg > 0, MBY ≥ 0, MBt ≤ 0, Bt < 0, BY > 0, and  t tη < −1.  
Taking the total differential of the above equations we obtain: 
() ( ) dm c dt MB dY MB dg MB t dt t MB dt MB t Y g t − = + + + + + η η η 1   
( ) dm g c dg c m dT dY B t dt B t dt B Y t − − = + + + 1  










dg t η                       This is equation (6) 
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                     This is equation (7) 
Finally, setting dT and dm equal to zero, we can obtain: 
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                   This is equation (10) 
where: 
() () () ( ) [ ] 0 1 1 1
2 < + + + + − = g t MB t B MB MB E c m D η η         This is equation (8) 
Equation (9) follows directly from the above expressions for dg/dT and dg/(cgdm). 












































With  () Y B t / = τ ,  () Y B B Y = θ ,  ( ) Y MB MB Y = ν , and  ( ) t MB MB t = φ , we can re-
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since tη/(1 + tη) = 1 – MCF.   Equation (12) is  dT dg dY dg / / κ = . 
 
Derivation of the Expression  [ ] θ ρ τ φ + =  












By Clairaut's theorem, VtY = VYt = ∂λ/∂t = -B(∂λ/∂Y) – λ(∂B/∂Y).  From equation (11): 
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Figure 1 
The Effect of a Lump-sum Transfer on Provision of a Public Service 
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The Effect of a Matching Grant on Provision of a Public Service 
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  30Figure 3 
The Effect of a Personal Income Increase on the Provision of a Public Service 
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